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Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power

Author: Robert Dallek
Publisher: Penguin Books Ltd
Category: Book

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Rating: 4.0 out of 5 stars

5 reviews
Sales Rank: 103004

Media: Paperback
Pages: 752
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.1
Dimensions (in): 7.7 x 5 x 1.6

ISBN: 0141018143
EAN: 9780141018140
ASIN: 0141018143

Publication Date: April 3, 2008
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Condition: New.

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•	Hardcover - Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power
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Customer Reviews:

4 out of 5 stars

An interesting but really depressing book June 7, 2008
If you ask people to describe Richard Nixon, they'd probably mention Watergate and Foreign Policy and use phrases like cunning, paranoia, bunker mentality and his desperate need to be number one. If they knew him better, they might even describe him as anti-semitic, for while he wasn't a Klan style racist, there was an element of anti-semitism to his character (as I learned from this book).

If you asked those same people to describe Henry Kissinger, they might mention his shuttle diplomacy and Nobel Peace Prize (for his work on Vietnam of all places) and use terms like ego, intellectual snobbery, and desperate need to be considered a leader. If they knew him better, they might mention his Jewishness.

This book examines the strange relationship between Nixon and Kissinger as they try to use foreign policy to deflect criticism of their personality and policies in other areas (inflation was 15% while they were in office).

It's a sad and rather depressing book. Both Nixon and Kissinger are presented as people who have some policy successes (the recognition of Red China, detente with Russia and the SALT I negotiations), but who have too many personality and policy faults (their over stated egos, along with Watergate and the failure in Vietnam) to be considered to true top draw political figures (in my humble opinion).

Overall, the book is interesting, you'll learn a good amount about two of the most interesting individuals in modern American political history. It does, however, leaves some holes. Firstly, the intricacies related to the formal replacement of Taiwan as the "true representatives of the Chinese people" in the UN isn't really covered (despite much of the book being about developing a relationship between America and China). This might be because Taiwan was treated shabbily (as suggested in the Doro Bush Koch book about George Bush Senior, who was the US Ambassador to the UN at the time) or because they were outwitted by Mao on the issue (as has been suggested by Jon Halliday and Jung Chang in their biography of Mao), but whatever the reasoning, its implementation isn't covered in the detail I'd like.

Secondly, when Dallek introduces the book, he claims that Nixon's drinking, drug abuse and mental instability should have been used to unseat him under Article 25 of the Constitution during the time leading up to Watergate. While you can see why he might make that decision (given the patch evidence he produces), I would argue he overstates his case. This is especially given that the son of Nixon's doctor wouldn't release Nixon's medical records.

Finally, Nixon's anti-semetism is pretty much glazed over, as is Kissinger's willingness to let Nixon's call him anti-semitic names. Blandly stating that Nixon's lower middle class upbringing (and Kissinger's pathological need to be Secretary of State) is the cause of his respective point of view is a gross oversimplification, in my view, and I would argue that it needs to be examined in greater detail, if I'm honest.

Other than that, this is a good book.

4 out of 5 stars

Excellent Walkthrough of Nixon/Kissinger approach to foreign policy April 6, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful

Robert Dallek's book is a well written, well structured walk-through the Nixon and Kissinger years - and it focuses heavily on their Foreign Policy analysis and execution - primarily because thats what Nixon and Kissinger thought would define their reign.

Would I recommend this book? Yes. Its easy to read and assuming you want to learn how/why Nixon/Kissinger did what they did, then this is a good way to do it.

((( But briefly my reaction on what I learnt**. Frankly I was shocked by the way the in which personal emotion, prejudice and opinions would so heavily influence the decisions that Nixon and Kissinger took. From Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Bangladesh, China, Chile - these 2 men let let their prejudices, in many instances, overcome the rational analysis to make decisions that negatively impacted countries and millions of people. Maybe I am just naive but where does morality come into governing? Its through laws right? But laws dont seem to apply to anyone you brand as your enemy - and simply branding them your enemy is too black and white - thats schoolyard behavior. The battles between Kissinger at the NSA and Rogers at the State Department defy belief. Nixon demonstrated poor leadership by allowing his lieutenants to war with each other in this way.)))

Anyway, thank you to Robert Dallek for writing this book and exposing how leaders govern and make decisions that impact us directly. I have probably reacted too strongly about Nixon/Kissinger themselves rather than focus on the book itself. ** But please note - thats my interpretation of what I have read, and not necessarily Mr Dalleks. **

I am sure you will have your own interpretation.

2 out of 5 stars

Flawed heroes or war criminals? March 26, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful

Robert Dallek, biographer of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, has now written an account of the Nixon presidency, but it is not as good as Seymour Hersh's magnificent The Price of Power.

In July 1968 Nixon and Kissinger told President Thieu of South Vietnam to reject US calls to begin participating in peace talks. In doing so, they broke the US law against private citizens conducting diplomatic negotiations.

Nixon campaigned on a platform of ending the war, yet sabotaged Johnson's final efforts to negotiate, and then escalated the war. Nixon and Kissinger always opposed unilateral withdrawal. They aimed to continue the US aggression against Vietnam until victory could be achieved. When they talked of an `honourable settlement', they meant one that achieved all the USA's war aims. More US soldiers would have to die so that the earlier deaths would not have been in vain, which, absurdly, equates to saving the dead.

Nixon and Kissinger cruelly indulged in sunshine talk about the war, promising the American people that one last push, one more invasion, would bring victory. But the truth was that the USA had lost. There was no alternative to withdrawal: their only choice was whether to end the war swiftly, or end it a bit later after killing yet more Vietnamese and having even more American soldiers killed pointlessly (20,000 were killed under Nixon).

Nixon and Kissinger never grasped that a quick exit from Vietnam would have helped, not undermined, US credibility. They never asked other governments what they thought about a speedy exit. Detente was just a cynical device to try to divide Vietnam from its allies, and it failed.

Dallek concludes that Nixon and Kissinger's policy towards Vietnam "was a disaster. Administration actions destabilized Cambodia, expended thousands of American, Vietnamese and Cambodian lives, gained no real advantage and divided the country." Actually, Nixon virtually united the country against him and against the war: by 1969, 71% of the American people wanted Nixon to withdraw 100,000 troops from Vietnam by the end of the year.

Nixon and Kissinger claimed that their policies were realistic and intelligent, but neither could see that the Vietnamese people were justly fighting for their national liberation. Nixon and Kissinger were not the tragic, flawed heroes that Dallek portrays but despicable war criminals.

4 out of 5 stars

Good but not a comprehensive history of the Nixon administration August 7, 2007
0 out of 2 found this review helpful

I was really looking forward to reading this as I particularly liked `Flawed Giant' about the Johnson administration - having finished and enjoyed it, I'm also slightly disappointed. Most of the foreign policy issues faced by Nixon and Kissinger are covered in detail, but there is practically no coverage of domestic political issues. Nixon himself had no interest in `building outhouses in Peoria' but this does not necessarily mean that it should have been omitted from `Partners in Power'. For example, toward the end of the book we are told `...Schlesinger, who replaced Laird as Secretary of Defence,......" without even an explanation of why Laird was replaced.

Other gripes include the remarkably scant coverage of the role of Spiro Agnew, who is mentioned briefly on only four or five occasions, and the inadequate coverage of the effects of Nixon's bombing of Cambodia and the means by which N&K illegally sought to cover it up. I also felt that more direct quotes, which are readily available, would have brought more life to the content.

However, Dallek does provide in-depth coverage of Vietnam, Yom Kippur War, OPEC crises and detente with the PRC and USSR, and the writing style easily maintains interest. The best aspect of the book (and to be fair the main objective) is the portrayal of the relationship between the president and his national security advisor. Startling similarities become apparent, and the author provides a particularly interesting analysis of the inner drivers motivating each man.

Overall, this is a very well written and enjoyable account of some aspects of the Nixon presidency and an intriguing study on the use and abuse of executive power. Kissinger was right when he said in 1968 `that man is not fit to be president'.

5 out of 5 stars

Irreconcilable Similarities April 30, 2007
4 out of 6 found this review helpful

There are several excellent books already in print by or about Richard M. Nixon and/or Henry A. Kissinger, notably Memoirs of Richard Nixon and Richard Reeves' President Nixon: Alone in the White House as well as Walter Isaacson's biography of Kissinger and The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow. However, with access to a wealth of sources previously unavailable, Robert Dallek has written what will probably remain for quite some time the definitive study of one of U.S. history's most fascinating political partnerships.

I defer to other reviewers to suggest parallels between the wars in Viet Nam and Iraq, especially when citing this passage in Dallek's Preface: "Arguments about the wisdom of the war in Iraq and how to end the U.S. involvement there, relations with China and Russia, what to do about enduring Mideast trensions between Israelis and Arabs, and the advantages and disadvantages of an imperial presidency can, I believe, be usefully considered in the context of a fresh look ast Nixon and Kissinger and the power they wielded for good and ill."

Until reading Dallek's book, I was unaware of the nature and extent of what Nixon and Kissinger shared in common. Of greatest interest to me was the almost total absence of trust in others (including each other) as, separately and together, they sought to increase their power, influence, and especially, their prestige. In countless ways, they were especially petty men and, when perceiving a threat, could be vindictive. They seemed to bring out the worst qualities in each other, as during their self-serving collaboration on policies "good and ill" in relationships with other countries such as China, Russia, Viet Nam, Pakistan, and Chile. Neither seemed to have must interest in domestic affairs (except for perceived threats to their respective careers) and Nixon once characterized them as "building outhouses in Peoria."

According to Dallek, "Nixon's use of foreign affairs to overcome impeachment threats in 1973-1974 are a distubring part of the administration's history. Its impact on policy deserves particular consideration, as does the more extensive use of international relations to serve domestic political goals throughout Nixon's presidency. Nixon's competence to lead the country during his impeachment cruisis also requires the closest possible scrutiny."

Most experts on this troubled period agree that the ceasefire agreement with North Viet Nam in 1973 was essentially the same as one that could have been concluded years before. However, both Nixon and Kissinger waited until after Nixon's re-election in1972 before ending a war that (by1966) Kissinger had characterized as "unwinnable." According to Dallek, with access to 2,800 hours of Nixon tapes and 20,000 pages of Kissinger telephone transcripts, Kissinger would "say almost anything privately to Nixon in the service of his ambition." Nixon referred to opponents of the war as "communists." As the Watergate crisis intensified, Meanwhile, Kissinger conducted press briefings that were "part reality, part fantasy, and part deception" and referred to Democratic senators critical of the administration as "traitors."

Although they were in constant collaboration until Nixon's resignation, Nixon and Kissinger were never very close. Anti-Semitic elements in Nixon's personality have been well-documented and certainly had some influence on his attitude toward Kissinger. At one point, he recommended (through John Ehrlichman) that Kissinger needed psychiatric therapy and should obtain it. Kissinger frequently referred to Nixon as "the meatball mind," "our drunken friend," and "That madman." It is certainly discomforting to realize that these two men, working together over a period of several years, made decisions and pursued policies that affected hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, "for good and ill."

I am now eager to read two other books (soon to be published) that may perhaps provide new insights and additional information about a political partnership that was probably doomed from the beginning because of so many irreconcilable similarities. Specifically Elizabeth Drew's Richard Nixon (part of "The American Presidents" series) and Jeremi Suri's Henry Kissinger and the American Century. However, I think Dallek's probing analysis will remain the definitive source of whatever can be known about these "partners in power."