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Warsaw 1920: Lenin's Failed Conquest of Europe

Warsaw 1920: Lenin's Failed Conquest of Europe

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Author: Adam Zamoyski
Publisher: HarperPress
Category: Book

List Price: £14.99
Buy New: £7.35
You Save: £7.64 (51%)



New (29) Used (3) Collectible (1) from £7.35

Rating: 4.0 out of 5 stars 5 reviews
Sales Rank: 4906

Media: Hardcover
Pages: 160
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.8
Dimensions (in): 8.1 x 5.4 x 0.9

ISBN: 0007225520
EAN: 9780007225521
ASIN: 0007225520

Publication Date: February 4, 2008
Availability: Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days
Condition: Brand new book dispatched from stock in the UK

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Customer Reviews:

5 out of 5 stars A Superbly Concise Description of this Important Campaign   June 21, 2008
 1 out of 1 found this review helpful

This is a superbly written little book that provides a concise history of the 1920 campaign that resulted in the defeat of Soviet forces by the newly formed Polish Army. Books describing military campaigns can often be tedious but Zamoyski overcomes this by writing with such elan that you find yourself rushing through the book. Thumbnail sketches are provided of the main protagonists including Pilsudski, Sikorski, and the Russians Tukhachevsky and Budionny as well as many other players including a young, and insubordinate political officer, Stalin. Other, more detailed tomes are available, (Norman Davies, 'White Eagle Red Star', 1972) but for the reader who is seeking a brief description of this most important of battles Zamoyski has done an excellent job. A number of good black and white photographs and campaign maps are provided in the text.


5 out of 5 stars Please read more history books   April 11, 2008
 6 out of 8 found this review helpful

I could not help but become incensed when I read Y. Mann's review of this book above. I suggest Mr. Y. Mann of NY that you go and read some more books on Eastern Europe and Poland from the 17th, 18th, 19th centuries, pre-world war I and WW2. You can start with God's Playground by Norman Davies and amongst others continue to For Your Freedom and Ours by Olson and Cloud. Quote "The idea here, apparently, is that it is OK for the Poles to take lands that belonged to them over a century ago before Poland was partitioned" well then according to you the very creation of a free Polish state was wrong. The Poles had offered the Whites help against the Bolsheviks in an agreement of a free Poland but the Whites refused to acknowledge that a Poland even existed, the same was true of the Bolsheviks, and it would be foolish to think that Communism would just sit by and allow a free state to exist right under their noses, such as 1939 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Quote " Bottom line is that the Red Army responded to a Polish threat. If there was no Polish threat there is no evidence one can point to which would undoubtedly show that the Red Army would have been used to spread the Revolution, especially considering the position Russia/Soviet Union found itself in after a bloody civil war.", the Red Army was well lead and organised for that period of time, just having beaten the Whites, what Poland did was pre-empt an attack that would no doubt be coming, the fact is a free Poland was always a threat to Communism I quote Stalin "Poland is about as suitable for communism as trying to put a saddle on a donkey". If you read Polish history Poland prides itself on being a country that never invaded and oppressed its neighbours, only a hardened Communist would believe that Bolshevism was liberation. The Polish invasion did not help the Bolshevik cause, Poland ensured freedom for the region for the next 20 years. Quote "their 'armies' at times were the furthest thing from what we picture in our minds as 'armies'" what did you depict any WW1 army to look like? WW1 western front was mainly fought by trench and artillery, on the eastern front a mixture heavily based on cavalry, the west and eastern fronts were just as motley as each other, I suggest more reading on this subject also. Only a communist can believe that Poland was the aggressor in this war, Poland has been fighting defensive conflicts in the interest of independence and "the Golden liberty" that was Poland from oppressors for centuries, again please read more about this subject...


4 out of 5 stars Short and to the point   April 4, 2008
 7 out of 8 found this review helpful

Having recently reread Norman Davies' account of the Polish Soviet war I was pleased to see that this book had been released. It is not the book that Davies' is, and does not really offer anything new, and Zamoyski more or less concedes this point himself. He has set out to offer an accessible and readable account of this overlooked and important conflict, which still echoes through those countries today. This he has achieved. If the book feels unsatifyingly short, it is probably only to Eastern Europe bores such as myself. To people coming fresh to the subject and the region it a quick and informative read which i would recommend.

Zamoyski is to be commended for bringing his status, hard won from fuller tomes on more popular subjects, to bear on this fascinating 'brawl', its origins, myths,conduct and consequences.



2 out of 5 stars Disappointing history   February 25, 2008
 26 out of 60 found this review helpful

This is a short book, some 140 pages of text and I have to say I am disappointed in the author. I read Zamoyski's book on Napoleon's invasion of Russia and thought it was quite good, but here, I'd say he's very much lacking. This is a 'niche' subject that few have covered and to date, as this book shows, it is a subject filled with bias and hypocrisy. The reader is confronted by the old idea that the not yet created Soviet Union wanted to and WOULD HAVE exported their revolution to Germany through Poland. That is an idea that is not based in fact, there were many who wanted to export the Revolution but at the same time, and this is in fact what really happened, there were those who understood that in time a revolution would begin anyway. That is the reason for signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty, they gave away land that they expected to take back at one point or another. When that point would come was anyone's guess since these people were not fortune tellers but revolutionaries who jumped at opportunities and, undoubtedly, at times tried to make those opportunities come about.

Zamoyski himself states on pg. 9 that it was the Poles who first attacked Soviet troops by taking Wilno (Vilnius) and then Minsk. The idea here, apparently, is that it is OK for the Poles to take lands that belonged to them over a century ago before Poland was partitioned, but the Russians cannot do the same thing (for which they also can bring up a claim as they DID control the land for the past century, etc, one should also note that Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc also have claims. But who has a claim matters little if they do not have an army to back that claim up with). Apparently, if you are only interested in nationalistic ideals that is OK with Zamoyski, but if you want to eventually spread the Communist ideal, that is going overboard. One has to keep in mind that when the Poles attacked the Red Army was facing Denikin in the south and on pg. 10 the author explains that the Army created in the West by the Russians was not strong enough to fight its way across Poland but rather only to fill a power-vacuum when available. The problem here is that the author, as far as I can tell, confuses what the Russians wanted to do with what they eventually would do. Just because some wanted to spread the revolution doesn't mean that's what would have happened. This can be seen by the fact that at least two of the leading Bolsheviks were against the war, Trotsky and Chicherin. Would Lenin still have attacked if the Poles didn't attack first? And then while peace negotiations were going on attack again and take the city of Dunaberg from the Russians and give it over to the anti-Bolshevik government of Lativa? A historian would not be able to give a concrete answer, but the author, apparently, can. Taking an extreme and making it seem as the only viable route is not the job of a historian. My real problem with this book is not the idea that if successful the Bolsheviks might have taken their revolution abroad, or that some wanted this from the start, but that the author is asserting this as a fact and that nothing could change it from happening, aside from, apparently, what did happen, makes sense?

If someone followed everything the Bolsheviks said and took it to heart, how can they then explain how Russian officers, known as 'enemies of the people', were then taken into the Red Army and named 'specialists' and in fact, put in charge of the Red Army (according to the author, by 1920 over 80% of the Red Army officer cadre would be made up of them)? Bolshevik rhetoric is just that, one has to be cautious in assuming that everything Lenin or anyone else said is what would have happened, especially during such a chaotic and turbulent time.

Bottom line is that the Red Army responded to a Polish threat. If there was no Polish threat there is no evidence one can point to which would undoubtedly show that the Red Army would have been used to spread the Revolution, especially considering the position Russia/Soviet Union found itself in after a bloody civil war. What happened in 1920 can be compared to what happened at the end of WWII, the Soviets did not export the revolution but they did enter Eastern Europe and Germany because they were on the COUNTERoffensive rather than an offensive. Hitler also claimed he was preempting a Soviet invasion, the Polish claim is taken seriously today while the German is known, by most, to be a complete fabrication. One can only wonder why that is.

A statement I vehemently disagree with is on pg. 13 when Zamoyski claims that for Russia and Lenin "...the best way of mobilizing support was war..." how can that be when not getting out of WWI is what ended Kerensky's run in the government and the Bolsheviks understood that they would be supported if they ended the war, thus the Brest Litovsk treaty! This can only be valid if seen in the context of the Polish invasion of Russia rather than any undertaking the Russians did before hand. With the Polish invasion many officers who had left the armed forces or never joined the Red Army in the first place came to it in droves and offered their support, such as the famous Brusilov. So, it might be argued that the Polish invasion helped increase support for the Bolshevik cause, but this is when the country is on the defensive, not the offensive, which is the author's original claim here. This can also be seen as the Poles rushed to support their troops when Warsaw was threatened, in both cases it was 'defensive' and 'counteroffensive' actions that rallied support, not outright offensive intentions.

If this book would have presented both sides in the same light, and I will readily admit that in some instances it does - for instance Polish and Russian atrocities against each other are listed, as well as some of the motley formations that were being led by both sides, their 'armies' at times were the furthest thing from what we picture in our minds as 'armies' - but overall this is in the end a biased looked at the events in question, and for that reason, I would not recommend it.



5 out of 5 stars The shame of our intellectual elite   February 25, 2008
 27 out of 32 found this review helpful

Few people are aware of the humiliating defeat inflicted on the Red Army in 1920. The Polish Army, with virtually no help from the West, destroyed an army several times its own size. Zamoyski demonstrates that the aim of Red Army--one of its leaders was Stalin--was nothing less than the conquest of Europe. Fresh from crushing the White Russian armies, they marched to the banks of the Vistula, and with Germany in turmoil, it looked as though nothing would stop them short of the Rhine. Even though morale began to crumble in the Polish Army, enough units maintained cohesion for Pilsudski to execute a daring flanking manoeuver which utterly routed the Red Army. Amazingly, Pilsudsky was not even a professional soldier, but his plan is recognised as a masterpiece of military planning.

The Poles got little help from the West, as pro-Soviet intellectuals were gaining the ascendency over Churchill and others who supported the White Russians. At the time, this could be understood--the egregious crimes of Lenin and Stalin were still in the future. There is no such excuse for their subsequent silence, which has virtually airbrushed Pilsudky's remarkable feat from the Western consciousness. Europe owes a huge debt to the Poles, who have fought tyrants three times in the last century--and won twice. Zamoysky's book is superb, drawing on first-hand accounts from both sides, and depicting the chaos and confusion of the times with remarkable clarity.