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Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941

Author: Ian Kershaw
Publisher: Penguin Books Ltd
Category: Book

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Rating: 3.5 out of 5 stars

8 reviews
Sales Rank: 13378

Media: Paperback
Pages: 656
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.1
Dimensions (in): 7.7 x 5.1 x 1.2

ISBN: 0141014180
EAN: 9780141014180
ASIN: 0141014180

Publication Date: February 28, 2008
Availability: Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days

Also Available In:

•	Paperback - Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
•	Hardcover - Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
•	Hardcover - Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941 (Allen Lane History)

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Customer Reviews: Read 3 more reviews...

5 out of 5 stars

A fascinating study of how decisions were made May 29, 2008
9 out of 9 found this review helpful

Kershaw examines ten choices that changed the world between the spring of 1940 and the end of 1941. Each of them could have been different (though Kershaw shows that the alternatives, usually lengthily and therefore somewhat repetitively rehearsed, were not very appealing, and sometimes not even sensible), and had they been different, the history of the Second World War and of the world following it would of course have been very different, too.

The first choice Kershaw examines is that of Britain refusing to negotiate with Hitler after the fall of France. The decision to fight on alone was taken by the inner war cabinet of only five men. Among them only the Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, argued strongly for exploring possible peace terms. The others (and the members of the outer cabinet whom Churchill briefly addressed rather than consulted) were won over by the new prime minister's charisma.

The British refusal to negotiate surprised Hitler. He believed that the British were holding out only because they hoped that the United States would eventually come into the war (which Hitler also believed) and that the Soviet Union might act against Hitler. The second of the choices was Hitler's conclusion that therefore he needed swiftly to attack and defeat the Soviet Union (which he thought would be `child's play') before he could force Britain to make peace and thereby also prevent US intervention. Kershaw stresses that Hitler had no cabinet meetings after February 1938, and all major decisions were essentially his own, often in defiance of even his military advisers. The plans of the German navy to force Britain to make peace by attacks in the Mediterranean were briefly considered by Hitler as a supplement, but not as an alternative, to the invasion of Russia. Kershaw believes that from Hitler's point of view, the attack on Russia was logical.

There is a fascinating chapter on the choices made by Mussolini: to enter the war in 1940 against the pessimistic warnings of the military, of his foreign minister Count Ciano, and of the king; followed by the even more fateful decision to attack Greece in 1941, this time egged on by Ciano who wanted to extend his quasi-fiefdom in Albania, but against the advice of the military and against German attempts to restrain him. Three times as many men were sent to Greece as were then in the Italian army in Libya. Had they been sent to Libya instead, the outcome of the African campaign might have been dramatically different.

Then there are the fateful choices made by Stalin: the emasculation of his armed forces in the purges of 1937; his pact with Hitler in 1939; and his refusal to the very last moment to act on intelligence information that Hitler would attack in 1941 rather than, as Stalin had anticipated, in 1942 at the earliest. Here again Kershaw is careful to examine alternative choices that could have been made, concluding that actually Stalin's choices narrowed greatly after the Purge.

Two chapters plot in great detail the slow but steady involvement of the United States in helping Britain with Lend-Lease, underlining Roosevelt's anxiety to do everything short of war to support Britain, even though Lend-Lease was likely to make American entry into the war almost unavoidable. Although public and congressional opinion supported these measures, Roosevelt dared not ask Congress for a declaration of war, fearing that at worst he would be defeated there, or at best that he would take a divided nation into the war. In all the other chapters decisions were made essentially by one man (in Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union) or by a small elite (in Japan - though with much debate within that elite -, and, in the first chapter, by Britain). Roosevelt was the only leader whose scope of action was restricted by democratic institutions. Only Pearl Harbour and Hitler's declaration of war on the United States resolved this dilemma for him.

Two chapters trace the choices was made by the Japanese. The first had been to attack China. China was too big a morsel to swallow whole, but enough to set Japan on a collision course with the United States. The second choice was to take advantage of the defeat of France and the expected defeat of Britain by planning for an expansion towards the south, deliberately running the risk that this was likely to bring the United States into the war. The debate inside the Japanese armed forces about this policy will be unfamiliar to most readers, and continued almost up to Pearl Harbour.

Immediately after Pearl Harbour, Hitler chose to declare war on the United States. Kershaw finds that decision more explicable than most other historians do, on the assumption that, sooner rather than later, the United States would have declared war on Germany even while at war with Japan. It seems to this reviewer the least convincing argument in the book.

The last `choice' Kershaw examines is the destruction of the Jews of Europe. This had always been in Hitler's mind, especially since he saw the Jews as responsible for Germany's defeat in the First World War and as steering the policies of Germany's two main enemies, the United States and Bolshevik Russia in the Second. The only question was how this destruction was to be accomplished. Hitler's choice was of course fateful for the Jews; but, unlike all the decisions described in the other chapters, it did not affect the outcome of the war; and the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, which sanctioned the `Final Solution', also falls just outside the period in the book's subtitle.

Only this last chapter lacks that tension of decision-making which gives the rest of the book such compelling quality.

2 out of 5 stars

Great idea, poor execution January 14, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful

I agree with the reviewer Elizabeth Kyten. Clearly, 1940-41 is the key period of WWII, casting shadows onto the years and decades beyond. But Kershaw's treatment of the theme is poor, focusing (as it does) solely on elite politics and written (as it is) in a pinched, monographical way, BY a historian, FOR other specialist historians (or similarly oriented students). Unless you want to know, for example, what a particular memo said on any one day of a key period selected by the author, give this book a miss. Although Kershaw ranges widely in his secondary reading (the book is very well researched), frankly one expects more than a compendium of that research from a historian of Kershaw's rank. The focus on elite actors - each chapter revolves around a very small group of people - gives the book a very narrow feel. Perhaps the most damning aspect, however, is the prolixity of the writing. Like a PhD thesis. Not many historians can write as vividly as Beevor, but this book should have been edited, and edited, then edited again. Badly written and too long at half the length. I say this as someone who studied history at UK universities (including the LSE, where IK taught, though for the record he did not teach me). Kershaw has been lauded for his contributions to the history of the Third Reich, but he needs to peel away the knighthood, the tv documentary attributions, the glowing broadsheet profiles, and remember what he is: a historian. This book is a shadow of what it could have been. Indeed, it's a shadow of what Kershaw himself could have made it had he not been in such a rush to go to print. Less is more.

2 out of 5 stars

Informative, but a HUGE pain to get through. December 16, 2007
10 out of 13 found this review helpful

This book is excellent in concept. Certainly, when learning about World War II, one wonders why certain decisions were made. For me, this was particularly true of the German decision to invade the Soviet Union and Hitler's choice to declare war on the United States. The fact that both questions were addressed in this book was one of the things that drew me to it.

This book is well-researched. However, I found it to be nearly unreadable. It is extremely dense and very circuitous in terms of sentence structure. In essence, it is not concise enough. When I got to the end of a section I would often have trouble remembering what the main points of it were because I was having so much trouble following it. I'm sure that part of my frustration was due to the fact that a crazy college schedule made it necessary for me to read it in short segments. However, I am also sure that the 470-page book could have been written in at least 2/3 of the words.

This book drove me crazy, and although I came out of reading it with a better understanding of World War II, I would gladly exchange the knowledge for a little bit of my lost sanity.

4 out of 5 stars

well-written, but no breaking news November 7, 2007
3 out of 3 found this review helpful

This is a very well-written narrative that you will find hard to put down once you have started reading. At the same time, those already fairly familiar with the history of WW II will find much that they already knew. For them it is hardly a surprise that Hitler reached his decisions without consulting anyone, that Stalin refused to believe that Russia was about to be attacked, that Mussolini was obsessed with the fear of being left out of the glory and spoils of the war that Hitler seemed to be winning hands down, and that it took Rooseveld a lot of cajoling to get his isolationist country into the war. But these are stories very well told, to the extent that you are annoyed that the story simply stops once the decision has been reached. But of course that is the point of this book.
Certainly for those who only know the big picture on WW II-history, this book provides valuable insight in how its major developments came about.

3 out of 5 stars

Fine idea badly executed October 23, 2007
12 out of 17 found this review helpful

Kershaw's book is a great idea: what were the decisions taken in 1940 - 41 which ultimately decided the course of the Second World War? What was the context behind these decisions and how did they play out? There's a great deal of scholarship in here and each chapter is well-researched, even if the conclusions could be summarised much more concisely than here.

My problem is that the writing is poor, often terrible. Kershaw likes to cram a lot into his sentences: so much so that you lose the plot half-way through.

Here's an example:"[Roosevelt] would often receive [Cordell] Hull and the sharp-minded, urbane and polished, but pompous and formal Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Wells - who had attended the same upper-class preparatory school as the president, had worn white gloves while playing in the country as a child and still had an "air of suspecting lurking contamination in his surroundings", his demeanour at best "on the chilly side" - while lying in bed at the White House, propped up against his pillows." That's the President who is propped on his pillow in case you couldn't work it out!

Here's another: "By the time Hitler had overrun what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, soon to be followed by Britain's guarantee for Poland, war in Europe within the near future seemed practically a certainty." I think what he means is that Hitler overran Czechoslovakia and then overran Britain's guarantee to Poland, but who knows? I'm afraid that these roadblocks to reading stop me in my tracks and have left me somewhat disappointed with this book. Perhaps next time Kershaw's editors can help him out.